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Introduction

The study of history is often mistaken for a static subject bent on the examination
of fixed events from which can be derived only a singular conclusion. However,
such a perspective presents a woeful ignorance of the subject itself and the events
under study. While the matters of the past are most certainly fixed in space, the
insight and opportunity for engagement presented by these same events are nearly
limitless in regard to the present and future. To this end, it is beneficial, even vital,
to pursue at least a general understanding of human history. The story of humankind
is not typically one of outstanding moral character or wisdom; indeed, there are
multiple chapters in which general sense and dignity seem to have abandoned our
race altogether. There exists no greater example than that of the era extending from
the late nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century, during which the subjugation of
different ethnic and cultural groups beneath others never was or has been equaled.
This subjugation was largely the product of the rise in imperialism within the
European political landscape that characterized the 1800s. Although imperialism
was hardly a new invention at the time, it was given far greater popularity and
potential in the wake of the Industrial Revolution around the turn of the nineteenth
century. The concept of empire building often conjures up images of British India,
French Algeria, or even the Belgian Congo, but, despite their late arrival to the
imperial playing field, it was Germany who commanded the world’s third largest
overseas empire. This empire was responsible for crafting a unique experience of
occupation for a multitude of ethnic groups on both the African and European
continents. These experiences, however, were far from isolated, either from each
other or from other imperial experiences, yet they are often considered in ostracism
from these other cases. To combat this inclination toward ostracism, it is necessary
to an examine the unifying themes of violence, imperialism, and genocide within
the evolution of the German imperial experience from German Southwest Africa

through World War I and up to the conclusion of World War II. By understanding
the shared trends of empire and genocide, and how each of these cases are uniquely
German, one can develop a greater understanding of the origins and outcomes of
imperial violence in order to bring the actions of the National Socialist party out of
its prolonged ideological isolation and into a global context of implication.
The path taken to arrive at this question of imperial trends and significance
was not a straight or narrow one. Instead, I came to this question through many
shifts and changes in trajectory, focus, perspective, and even major. I initially
entered my undergraduate research process as a major in English Literature hoping
to examine the effects of various written works on progress and development within
the spheres of society, politics, race, environment, and gender by looking at the
changes enacted by works like Uncle Tom’s Cabin, The Jungle, Silent Spring, and
Heart of Darkness. As it would happen, I arbitrarily decided to open Joseph
Conrad’s work first and was struck by the historical implications already at play
within the short novella. Under the guidance of Dr. Pizzo, I decided to narrow my
concentration into an examination of exclusively imperial literature in order to work
with a four-part case study of British, French, German, and Belgian imperialism,
but by the time I ended my freshman year, I had resolved to abandon the role of
literature altogether and instead delve further into the historiography of solely
German imperialism. Upon returning to my research in the spring of my sophomore
year, I intended to renew my comparison between the genocides of the Herero
people of Southwest Africa under the Kaiserreich and the Jews of Europe under the
National Socialists; however, that fall I introduced a third case to my study by
including the occupation experience of Eastern Europeans during World War I,
despite the fact that this case did not fall into the category of genocide.
Nevertheless, each of these cases were prime examples of imperial ventures gone
terribly awry that serve as a warning for future generations of the dangers and
sorrows of racist expansionism.

The origins of the term imperialism offer a certain limited insight into the
nature of its meaning; the word stems from the Latin root in the word imperare,
meaning to command. This meaning can stretch from the most basic form,
command of a group, to the more complex and indicative form, command of a
nation, an idea, a land. Certainly, many European nations of the modern age
engaged in both levels of imperare on every continent across the globe, Germany
not the least of which. The simple knowledge of imperialism’s etymology,
however, is far from sufficient to grasp its origins, characteristics, or aims.
Imperialism was actually born centuries before Germany ever united under a single
national banner. In fact, in many ways, imperialism is as old as civilization itself,
shaped by mankind’s constant desire to expand and accrue wealth and power. This
selfsame desire has never evaporated from humanity and indeed gained
considerable traction over the course of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth
centuries so that by the nineteenth, the powers that be in Europe had come to base
their international power and influence on the pursuit and acquisition of large and
profitable overseas holdings. The last decades of the eighteenth century would have
perhaps the largest impact on the trajectory of the following centuries with the birth
of the Industrial Revolution in Great Britain. The innovation of the steam engine,
the mechanization of industry, and the development of the factory system suddenly
resulted in a rapid increase in demand for raw materials and laborers. Most
European powers saw fit to pursue this demand in other lands on the backs of other
peoples, regardless of their interest or consent. Britain, France, Belgium, Germany,
and multiple other nations carved up the rest of the “uncivilized” world in their
quest for palm oil, coal, and rubber. By the outbreak of World War I, hardly a
fraction of Africa remained independently ruled, and huge swaths of Asia and South
America also remained under the yoke of European imperialism.
So, what then qualifies imperialism now that its origins as a mode of human
expansion are understood? Imperialism can be best quantified in terms of

psychological, political, and economic factors. The psychological factors at play
are most often distilled down to a simple reference to Rudyard Kipling’s poem,
“The White Man’s Burden,” in which Kipling references the almost divine duty of
the white man to liberate the rest of the world from its perceived cultural inferiority.
This racist precept was fueled by the growing popularity of new academic
disciplines like ethnography, anthropology, and other fields shadowed by racism
based on Darwin’s concept of competition and natural selection. Under the guise
of scientific racism, European empires justified their aggressive expansionism as
an obligation to uplift the “savage hordes” and force European culture, politics, and
society on them. Working in tandem with this psychological motivator were the
political elements of nationalism and prestige. By basing a country’s self-worth on
its ability to conquer other nations, European states became engaged in a patriarchal
struggle of proving their virility as a marker of national pride and glory. The
development of nationalism as a tangible term and concept in the early years of the
nineteenth century was intrinsic to the development of this second factor in
imperialism. Beforehand, countries were much more preoccupied with the third
factor of imperialism: economic interests. Although the Industrial Revolution
added a new facet of demand for raw materials, empires were already highly
interested in the acquisition of new markets and ports for international trade as well
as creating settlements in areas where lucrative materials were readily available.
With the addition of the demands of the Industrial Revolution, expansion took on a
whole new fervor in an effort to outrace other groups and achieve market
superiority, thus securing a rich influx of goods and products at a fraction of their
worth. Each of these factors coalesced to create an environment in which
imperialism was not just desirable but viewed as nigh on vital for the future of the
nation.
The choice to concentrate on German imperialism, despite the fact that the
German Empire was not the largest on the globe, was made based on the unique

trajectory of German history. To be fair, there is no model of normality against
which any nation’s history can be measured, but Germany has walked a path that
diverges so starkly from that of its neighbors, moving from reticent empire-builders
to genocidal harbingers and finally to peace activists almost within the same
century, that it stood to reason to ask why. To answer this, the development of
German imperialism must be analyzed through four primary realities: German
pathos, radical improvisation, cognizance of their contemporaries, and modern
industrialization. Each of these factors combined to create a uniquely German
experience of imperialism. It then became a matter of identifying which cases of
German imperial history would be addressed and investigated. The Herero
genocide seemed a logical beginning based on its chronology, characteristics, and
status as an example of genocide. The occupation of Eastern Europe during World
War I was the next step due to its position between the two greatest examples of
genocide committed by Germans, while simultaneously retaining a level of horror
unprecedented until that point and not sharing its neighbors’ genocidal
categorization. The final step had to fall upon the years of World War II, in which
the National Socialists occupied vast swaths of land east of their original border
and committed unequaled acts of horror and violence. Each of these three cases
serves to outline the evolution of imperialism within German history so that by
tracing this development, a conclusion may be drawn that can help point out future
situations of atrocity and bloodshed before they can denigrate into full on slaughter.
Through a better understanding of how such horrors originate and progress,
mankind might better its ability to prevent them rather than remove them.
To properly consider each case and the historiography that connects them,
a vast array of secondary literature was consumed. In the early days of this project’s
evolution, when the question of research still dealt with the role of literature within
the political sphere, the book first analyzed was that of Swedish author Sven
Lindqvist. His 1992 work Exterminate All the Brutes: One Man’s Odyssey into the

Heart of Darkness and the Origins of European Genocide was slim in form but
heavy in content. The author meandered effortlessly from cover to cover in a
melding of genres and styles: part travelogue, part historical reflection, and part
creative writing exercise, all the while having been elegantly translated into English
from his native Swedish. Organized as a series of sections numbering a startling
one hundred and sixty-nine, Lindqvist uses Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness as
a literary lens through which he transitions from present day observations of his
travels across the Saharan desert to analyses of these countries’ colonial pasts, while
interjecting occasional ruminations on human nature and his own experience with
the legacies of the lands and people he encountered on his journey. Even aside from
the unique organization utilized by the author, this book serves as one of the first
examples of the push to consider the actions of the Holocaust in relation to previous
instances of genocide on a European scale rather than as an anomaly or a purely
German phenomenon. Indeed, Lindqvist takes great pains to document not just the
actions and ideologies of German figures like Georg Gerland and Friedrich Ratzel,
the latter of whom made the ominous observation that “a people that does not wish
to share the fate of the dinosaurs must constantly increase its living
space…territorial expansion is the safest, indeed fundamentally the only real sign
of the vitality of the nation and the race,” but also the horrors committed by
Frenchmen Voulet and Chanoine, Belgium’s King Leopold, and the WelshAmerican journalist Henry Morton Stanley.1 Yet the greatest value of Lindqvist’s
work lies in his final words on section one hundred and sixty-nine in which he
states, “it is not knowledge we lack. What is missing is the courage to understand
what we know and draw conclusions.”2 This final thought was the thought that

Sven Lindqvist, Exterminate All the Brutes: One Man’s Odyssey into the Heart
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Lindqvist, Exterminate All the Brutes, 172.
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redirected an entire research project and turned it to a new trajectory aimed at
understanding and challenging preconceived notions of racism, violence, and
culpability. Rather than merely borrowing from German precedent or
understanding, my research would turn to contemplate the global consequences of
these cases.
The next step came in the form of Shelley Baranowski’s concise analysis of
Germany’s specific imperial odyssey: Nazi Empire: German Colonialism and
Imperialism from Bismarck to Hitler. Opening with an observation of GermanJewish political theorist Hannah Arendt’s coverage of Adolf Eichmann’s 1961 trial,
Baranowski succinctly dissects the origins and existence of the two competing
perspectives of Germany’s imperial legacy by stating how “the first focuses on the
long-term impact of Imperial Germany’s maritime colonialism before the Great
War, and explores the possible continuities between Imperial German colonial
practices and the Third Reich…[while a] second and more recently articulated
position that challenges the first recognizes that ‘Germany,’ be it the Holy Roman
Empire until its dissolution in 1806, or the Second Empire after 1871, was a
continental empire well before it ever ventured overseas.”3 Yet Baranowski argues
that each of these perspectives is limited in their scope by their inability to grasp
the unifying factors of empire, colonialism, and genocide. Instead, she offers a third
view that takes into account all the various stressors on German identity from the
failure of the Teutonic knights through the upheaval of the Reformation and the
devastation of the Thirty Year’s War, past the debasement of the Napoleonic Wars
and the failure of the 1848 Revolution, up to the incomplete Unification of 1871,
and finally the shameful dissolution of the Kaiserreich in the aftermath of the First
World War. She uses this context to create a narrative that understands the complex
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interplay of ambition and dread that characterized German imperialism from 1871
to 1945. Although Baranowski’s scholarship begins only on the eve of Unification,
the fact that she takes into consideration all of Germany’s difficult and disparate
past is telling of the ramifications it has on the present. Throughout the course of
her work, the author details the evolution of imperialism through this selfconstructed prism, noting how “the perceived ‘failure’ to eliminate social, religious,
and ethnic divisions at home led increasingly to the demonization of domestic
‘enemies,’ who appeared to be the agents of foreign foes.”4 By synthesizing such a
vast body of work with such a unique scope, Baranowski offers a startlingly
compelling argument behind the origins of imperial violence.
Following this trend of long-term contextualization of mass violence is Yale
University history professor Ben Kiernan’s sobering work Blood and Soil: A World
History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to Darfur. As befitting its
substantial size, Kiernan’s book is unique for both the chronological length of its
scope and the global nature of his enquiry. Throughout the course of Blood and
Soil, Kiernan analyzes no fewer than fifteen separate cases of genocide from the
dawn of civilization to cases that are still ongoing, including the Herero Genocide
and the Holocaust, through a lens of four unifying themes: racial competition,
glorification of agriculture, the need to expand borders, and obsession with the
precedent set by antiquity. Phrased in such a way, these themes can seem difficult
to associate, not only with each other but also with the subject of genocide in the
first place, but Kiernan painstakingly defines and identifies each of the trends
within each genocidal chapter so as to make note of the fact that “the persistent
recurrence among genocide perpetrators of ideological obsessions with violent
ethnic prejudice, whether racial or religious, with cults of antiquity and agriculture,
and with territorial expansion, reveals possibilities for predicting and hopefully
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preventing further cases of genocide in the twenty-first century.”5 Therefore, over
the course of his book, he points out that racism has existed under many guises
since the dawn of civilization while veneration of agriculture has fluctuated in
popularity; however, the drive for expansion has always been popular among
cultures on every continent. The cult of antiquity is perhaps the most difficult trend
to understand, but Kiernan simply states that each group that has engaged in
genocidal actions has invoked the image and blessing of a past group from whom
they claim heritage, whether that lineage is factual or not. In most Western
societies, this cult often manifests itself as an obsession with the Greek or Roman
pathos, which can be clearly identified in nearly every European nation’s art,
architecture, and political design. With such specific trends laid out in each case,
Kiernan’s work is a one-of-a-kind contribution to the development of genocide
studies and the push to recognize previously ignored instances of horror.
Some of the more recent additions to the scholarship of German-Eastern
European relations are Dr. Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius’s 2000 installment War Land
on the Eastern Front: Culture, National Identity, and German Occupation in World
War I and his 2009 novel The German Myth of the East: 1800 to the Present, in
which the University of Tennessee-Knoxville professor analyzes the relationship
between Germany and Eastern Europe in politics, religion, and culture. Both books
offer a concise synthesis of the German perspective of the East in all its
contradictory fascination and repulsion, ultimately outlining how this perspective
has shaped German identity to this day. Opening the latter book with a remark on
the similarities between the German view of the East and the American myth of
‘Manifest Destiny,’ Liulevicius articulates the curious nature of the former as an
almost existential question fraught with the interplay of the East as “both a site of
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the future and its promise and at the same time a location of peril, associated with
the past.”6 Continuing his examination, the author is also careful to define the terms
of his title: German, myth, and East. In this book, “German” refers not only to those
inhabitants of the nation-state but speakers of the language in all parts of the
continent, while “myth” refers not to a cluster of lies but rather to a complex of
ideas and hopes. Rather more difficult to understand is the concept of the “East”
which, for the purposes of this enquiry, defies the confines of geography and instead
embodies a concept of disorganization and low culture. Building from these
established principles, Liulevicius outlines three topics for the scope of his work:
the flexibility of the German myth of the East; the definition of what constituted a
“German;” and the presence of recurring terms and themes throughout the
fluctuations of the Eastern myth. Each of these questions is subsequently explored
throughout the course of Liulevicius’s work, even as he takes great care to reject
the tired Sonderweg theory of the mid-twentieth century, which argues for the
inevitability and peculiarity of German history’s march toward National Socialism.
The Sonderweg theory was first proposed during World War II as a justification for
German exceptionalism, yet it fails to explain the proposed norm against which
German history is measured. As such, Liulevicius argues that continuities cannot
be misconstrued as causations by referring to his three research questions at hand,
whose answers firmly reject the notion that an extermination of the people of the
East was a foregone conclusion.
In 2003, Dr. Claudia Koonz, then professor of history at Duke University
and one of the preeminent historians on feminism within the Third Reich, published
her last academic work, The Nazi Conscience, in which she examined the intangible
construction of the Nazi moral complex. The idea of the National Socialists having
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a system of moral standards to which members were held in strict accordance seems
to contradict modern stereotypes about bloodthirsty, warmongering, savage Nazis
who rejected any kind of cultural diversity or freedom of expression. To be sure,
such rejection is not incorrect, but then, neither is the presence of this moral
complex despite the stereotype. In an effort to articulate this oft-dismissed layer in
the full picture of National Socialism, Koonz offers her work as a basis for critique
by laying out four assumptions upon which the Nazi conscience operates: the life
of a Volk organic in its life cycle; community values are dependent on their nature
and environment; outright aggression against “undesirable” populations in
conquered lands are justified by the advantage to the Volk; and the right of the
government to void the rights and protections of assimilated citizens were based on
race. These assumptions cleared the way for the implementation of the Nazis’
central ideological principles of the cult of the Volk, phobic racism, and the pursuit
of Lebensraum, the mythic concept of land destined for German use in the East.
Yet the bridge between the baseline assumptions and the tenets of National Socialist
philosophy is the very conscience upon which the latter relied. In short, the Nazi
conscience relied on glorification of the Volk and its concerns above all else in the
effort of promoting a strong and healthy community that need not fear foreign
intervention. To accomplish this, Koonz echoes the vexation of German poet Hans
Carossa who wrote, “there’s a lot going on here in Germany: we are being
laundered, purified, scrubbed, disinfected, separated, nordicized, toughened up,
and, I caught myself almost adding, alienated.”7 Carossa’s fears of alienation were
directly in tune with the fears of the time in which Nazi propaganda strove to dissect
German society into a multitude of dichotomies: Aryan or not, Jewish or not, friend
or not.
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A decade into the new millennium saw the addition of a remarkable new
body of work to the field of modern historical scholarship. While working as a
professor of history at Yale University, author Timothy Snyder created this new
addition, Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin, to investigate the
ideologies and experiences of Eastern European occupation under both the German
and Soviet dictators. Snyder’s work is exceptional because of the geographical
region in which he writes, including not only Eastern Europe but also the eastern
and western peripheries that make up the occupying forces themselves. As a history
of political mass violence, this book places its roots firmly in the soil of World War
I whilst wading through the events that led up to and involved the Second. Indeed,
Snyder makes the point that this work operates on the observation made evident by
the First World War that “showed that millions of men would obey orders to fight
and die, for causes abstract and distant, in the name of homelands that were already
ceasing to be or only coming into being.”8 In a departure from the more common
practice of round figures, Snyder represents these men and the victims of their
violence at complete numerical figures, never rounding them off to clean even
thousands but rather calculating them down to the individual. This choice
underlines both his respect for those affected by political mass violence and his
understanding of the lives represented by those figures. Each tally mark represents
someone’s son or daughter, mother or father, friend or cousin. Snyder’s resolve to
symbolize that significance is a testament to the importance of his argument:
violence, whether stemming from identical or opposite political doctrines, ruins
lives and lands more effectively than any other factor or event.
Study of the Nazi Reich has been a central component of Modern European
historical study for the last seven decades, with the atrocities of the East often taking
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a secondary role in relation to the Western Front. Nevertheless, those who did study
the horrors in the East divided the cadre into three levels of complicity, ranging
from sadists at one end of the spectrum to dissenters at the other. While historical
discourse had originally focused on these two extremes, retired professor of history
Christopher R. Browning’s 1992 book Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion
101 and the Final Solution in Poland was one of the first works to shift the focal
point to the previously ignored middle group comprised of those who merely went
through the motions of their orders, neither objecting nor capitalizing on them. Over
the course of this work, Browning examines the men of Reserve Police Battalions
101 who, as middle-aged, working-class individuals drafted from Hamburg, were
their SS superiors’ opposites in every way. Yet despite their contradiction to the
typical Nazi profile, these men were an accessory to the round-ups, marches, and
mass shootings that characterized the earliest stage of the Holocaust in the East. To
make matters worse, several of the men were offered an opportunity to accept other
roles that did not require murder, but each offer was summarily rejected. To
determine why any of the perpetrators in the East, SS or otherwise, would become
willing executioners, Browning proposed a number of reasons, including “wartime
brutalization, racism, segmentation and routinization of the task, special selection
of the perpetrators, careerism, obedience to orders, deference to authority,
ideological indoctrination, and conformity.”9 In the case of Reserve Police
Battalion 101, however, Browning distilled his argument down to three primary
factors: vertical, lateral, and environmental pressures. Drawing equally on
historical as well as psychological research, Browning’s assertion is critical for the
universality of its application. These pressures are not uniquely German, but rather
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uniquely human, and are therefore subject to repetition until such a time as mankind
acknowledges its darker nature.

Chapter One: The Herero and Nama Genocide

Though distant from Germany both in geography and societal makeup, the lands
comprised of present-day Namibia were nevertheless brought under German
occupation in the late nineteenth century and would remain so until the invasion of
South African troops in 1915 during the First World War. Yet while conquering
European powers liked to stylize their actions as “discovery” of new territories,
these lands had in fact been populated for millennia before the coming of European
explorers by peoples like the Nama and, later, the Herero. The Herero were not the
original inhabitants of the region of Namibia, nor were they a single people, but
rather composition of numerous subsets that share a common tongue within the
Bantu language tree. Most Herero peoples lived as pastoralists, herding cattle,
sheep, and goats and basing their social hierarchy on the size of one’s herd.
Contrary to standard Western ideals, the Herero hierarchy was not simply
patrilineal but operated on the basis of a double descent system, which placed value
on the mother’s as well as the father’s family lines. In a review of Carlos Laranjo
Medeiros’s short work on the Herero people’s kinship customs, Alan Barnard
briefly identifies the aspects discussed in Medeiros’s chapter on kinship as “an
analysis of the complicated system of relationship terms, together with a description
of the double descent system, a statement of the rules of incest avoidance,
preferential marriage and inheritance, and even an account of burial customs as
these relate to descent group structure.”10 The Nama were likewise a people based
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on herding, but their language belonged within the Khoe-Kwadi language group, a
separate family entirely from the Bantu languages. The establishment of their
relationship with the Herero peoples was relatively recent, however. The Herero
did not trickle into present-day Namibia, the traditional homeland of the Nama,
until the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In doing so, the Herero brought
themselves into contact and eventual conflict with the pre-established people as
each vied for grazing land and the opportunity to build their respective herds. With
the introduction of European imperialists who deigned not to learn the difference
between the two peoples, however, both the Herero and Nama would share a similar
fate of exploitation and extermination.
The terrible commencement of this fate began decades earlier than its
fulfillment with the calling of the infamous Berlin Conference in the winter of 1884.
Having unified only thirteen years earlier, Germany had yet to embark on any
overseas conquests, a reticence that predated unification and was encouraged by
Otto von Bismarck, Germany’s iconic Iron Chancellor. Previous involvement in
colonial enterprise was limited to the signing of the 1879 “Friendship Treaty” with
Samoa and several other European powers, but according to co-authors Julia Hell
and George Steinmetz, “the conventional date marking the onset of the formal
German empire is April 24, 1884, when Germany declared Southwest Africa a
protectorate.”11 Later that year, the Conference for the partition of Africa began
with representatives from nearly every major and minor Western power and the
Ottomans in attendance but notably excluded those from any existing or prospective
African colonies. The conference would outlast the year and continue onto the next,
Medeiros, Africa: Journal of the International African Institute 54, no. 2 (1984):
110, accessed October 23, 2017, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1159923.
11
Julia Hell and George Steinmetz, “The Visual Archive of Colonialism:
Germany and Namibia,” Public Culture 18, no. 48 (2006): accessed April 24,
2016, http://publicculture.org/articles/view/18/1/the-visual-archive-ofcolonialism-germany-and-nam.

yet, despite its length, A.G. Hopkins, in his review of Bismarck, Europe and Africa,
remarks on the significance of preeminent scholar S.E. Crowe’s reading of the
event, stating “there is general agreement…that [the Conference] did not cause
partition and that Crowe was broadly correct in minimizing its influence.”12
Nevertheless, the Conference was responsible for marking a sudden shift in public
opinion concerning colonialism. Despite the claim that such endeavors were in
favor of commercial expansion, research conducted by Dr. Rempel at Western New
England College states that “by the 1820s several countries, after having long
colonial connections, had lost these connections without suffering any apparent
economic deprivation.”13 Harmut Pogge von Strandmann, however, points out that
no fewer than six factors in the rise of German overseas aspirations arose in the
latter half of the nineteenth century, including emigration, increased investment in
global trade, growth of missionary societies, a fascination with exploring “exotic”
landscapes, the creation of colonial pressure groups, and the spread of colonial
propaganda.14 Echoing the argument of Rempel, Joseph A Schumpeter reasoned
instead that imperialism was driven more by the act of action, for the simple sake
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of being a goal for a nation to accomplish.15 Schumpeter’s strongest argument,
however, is one that coincides with Yale scholar Kiernan’s pre-established theories
on genocide: imperialism is an atavism. Just as certain species honor their
hereditary roots with retentive genes, both imperialism and genocide exhibit
tendencies to revert back to a preconceived notion of an ancestral precedent. This
tendency served as one of the largest prompting factors in validating colonial
ventures abroad.
With the establishment of Southwest Africa as a German protectorate in
1884 and the claiming of modern day Tanzania and the Republics of Cameroon and
Togo by the following year, Germany had established itself as a serious player in
the realm of colonial enterprise, superseded only by the French and the British in
scale of conquest. Having created an overseas empire of considerable diversity, the
German Reich was able to call upon the resources provided by “hunters in the
Kalahari desert, Nama pastoralists, Ngoni soldiers, Islamic lords in the Sudan,
Swahili-speaking traders, and many others” to provide the economic gain that
purportedly accompanied imperialism.16 With the smallest number of indigenous
people living within the second largest territory under German imperial control,
alongside the virtual nonexistence of malaria, Southwest Africa appeared to be the
most ideal location to begin colonizing in earnest. Thus, the invasive acquisition of
land and resources once occupied by the Herero and Nama peoples began, whose
lifestyle relied on the freedom to let their herds graze across vast tracts of land.
Rather than simply seizing the land through brute force, German colonial officials,
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led first by Heinrich Göring, father of Hermann Göring, then Curt von François,
and finally by Theodor Leutwein, relied on the strict traditions of Herero kinship
and their own stereotypical ideas about “tribal” governance to bribe and blackmail
local Herero leaders into working with the invaders against the best interest of their
people. One such leader was Samuel Maharero, a man who had been educated in
local Lutheran schools and initially attempted to maintain peaceful relations with
the German colonial administration. Maharero was far from the only Herero man
to receive a Western education, and, indeed, many of the indigenous peoples were
highly familiar with Western dress, customs, ideals, and technology. Even with this
knowledge, however, Maharero and plenty of his contemporaries were transformed
into puppet proxies, while Leutwein and the German officials stripped countless
Herero clans of their land, committed numerous cases of rape against Herero and
Nama women and girls, used alcohol as a tool of exploitation, and withheld the
right to testify in colonial courts. The myriad of indignities compounded to create
an intense atmosphere of tension and resentment between the German subjugators
and the subjugated Herero and Nama.
Life under German rule was harsh and uncompromising for the indigenous
population. Their land, which had been virtually stolen from them by intoxicating
local leaders and forcing their signatures on legal documents in a language they
could not read, was converted from its original use as grazing territories to mass
plantations for cotton and other export crops or as building sites for new railroads.
The indigenous people were then used as cheap labor for the plantations, a direct
insult to both their humanity and their former way of life. The final blow came in
the form of a vicious viral infection that ravaged entire herds of cattle and domestic
buffalo. In hardly any time at all, this rinderpest epidemic destroyed nearly ninety
percent of the cattle population in the region and thus eliminated the primary source
of wealth and diet for the Herero and Nama peoples. Having already been
undermined by the machinations of the German colonists, Herero society was

further weakened by this cattle plague by “forcing large numbers of Hereros off the
land and into the labor market [while] new warlords such as Kajata and Willy Kain,
as well as Samuel Maherero, sought to exploit the situation by exporting labor and
selling land.”17 The loss of their land was, for many Herero and Nama peoples, the
final blow. Unable to preserve their disease-ridden herds, left without a means to
pay back the loans they had taken from German settlers at exorbitant interest rates,
and faced with the prospect of continued rape, forced labor, unlawful
representation, and betrayal by their own ruling elite, the Herero peoples, led by the
man who had once contributed to their misery, Samuel Maharero, joined their
neighbors and rose up in a mass revolt in January of 1904.
The initial response of the Herero people to this intolerable environment
was a desperate attack on a German settlement that ended with the deaths of
between 120 and 150 colonists. Governor Leutwein, hoping to maintain a
semblance of peace and order within the protectorate, negotiated the armistice of a
group of Herero rebels, but, while Leutwein believed the conflict to have been
resolved and thus withdrew many of his armed forces, Maharero and his followers
occupied Okahandja and declared independence from the German colony based in
Windhoek. Now forced to acknowledge that the situation had escalated beyond his
control, Leutwein sent to Berlin for reinforcements to deal with the uprising in May
of 1904. By June of that year, these reinforcements had arrived with a new
commander for the colony, General Lothar von Trotha. Whereas Leutwein had
favored a policy of surrender for the renegade Herero people, von Trotha
immediately differentiated himself from his predecessor by articulating his
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perception of the indigenous peoples as a naturally violent culture and then
announcing his intention to eradicate the whole of the indigenous population, an
echo of the passionate request of a Pan-German leaflet some fourteen years earlier
that called for all Germans to “be a conquering people which takes its portion of
the world itself!” 18 Just two short months after their arrival in Southwest Africa,
von Trotha’s forces had defeated the brunt of the Herero fighting force in the Battle
of Waterberg. Cutting off access to all watering holes in the area, the German
soldiers drove the survivors into the Omaheke region of the Kalahari Desert,
ruthlessly cutting down any individuals who fell behind, including women,
children, and the elderly, despite their being unarmed and unable to offer any
resistance. Of the thousands who fled the killing ground of Waterberg, less than a
thousand made it across the desert to British-controlled Bechuanaland, where they
were offered asylum from the Germans. Most were not so lucky.
In October of 1904, von Trotha sealed the doom of the Herero peoples with
the issuance of his infamous Extermination Order, in which he set a price on the
head of the Herero elite and promised armed retribution to any Herero who
attempted to return to his homeland, including women and children, whom he
promised to “drive…back to their people or let them be shot at.”19 In recent years,
some historians have attempted to deemphasize the importance of the
Extermination Order, yet such a proclamation represents indisputable proof of the
German colonial military’s willingness to employ the most extreme measures
possible to achieve their goal of living space in Africa. In light of their obsession
with ancestral precedent, reliance on racial tropes, pursuit of foreign territory, and
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exploitation of preexisting economic factors, the German occupation of Southwest
Africa was a textbook example of Kiernan’s genocidal themes. Although von
Trotha purportedly intended for his troops to merely shoot over the heads of fleeing
women and children, co-authors David Olusoga and Casper Erichsen rightly point
out that for these troops “hundreds of miles from their senior commanders,
operating on the fringes on an endless desert and under orders to shoot Herero on
sight, it may well have been a very small step for exhausted men to reinterpret their
orders as a license to kill all Africans.”20 Most women and children were, in fact,
spared a death by bullets yet subjected to sexual assault before being turned out into
the desert to die of starvation and dehydration. In response to these vast cruelties,
the Nama people joined their former neighbors in rebellion in the same month that
von Trotha issued his order, yet, by the end of the year, new orders from Berlin had
come that mandated the removal of “survivors” to newly erected concentration
camps under German colonial control.
The modern concept of the concentration camp, or Konzentrationslager, is
often given German origins; however, the first such settlement was in fact
implemented by the British during the Second Boer War during the turn of the
twentieth century. The first German iteration came less than a year into their
conflict with Herero, most notably in the form of Shark Island, a miserable,
windswept mass of rocks just off the coast of Namibia. In this camp, as well as the
others scattered across the colony, Herero and Nama peoples were crowded into
squalid barracks where disease, starvation, and exhaustion through work rapidly
diminished the population. Missionaries of various faiths were even allowed inside
to proselytize the prisoners on a weekly schedule, despite the purpose of the conflict
being “to eradicate the Herero as an ethnic group from German South-West Africa,
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either by their extermination or by their wholesale expulsion from the colony.”21
Hundreds of prisoners of all ages and sexes were used in systematic studies to
validate European ideals of racial superiority; German guards put their captives to
work doing hard physical labor while countless women were pressed into sex
slavery. These studies were powered by the drive to develop the fields of
anthropology and ethnography, which at that time served to perpetuate the idea of
“tribalism” as a way of over simplifying and trivializing the monolithic social
structure of indigenous peoples. This racist ideology, already prevalent among
intellectual groups and growing with each passing year, was also rampant among
the common people, though to a much less precise degree. In his written
recollections, a German foot soldier named Gustave Freensen documented his
experiences while on campaign from 1903 to 1904, during which he remarked how
he “was surprised that so many hard undertakings, of which I had never heard or
read so much as a word, had been carried through by Germans, and that already so
much German blood had been lavishly spilled in this hot, barren land.”22
Underlining the fact that the common German displayed little understanding of his
environment while maintaining a deeply ingrained complex of blood superiority,
Freensen’s story is also a chilling tale of brutality against “the enemy,” a brutality
that Kaiser Wilhelm II praised in his speech to the Reichstag in November of 1905
in which he proclaimed that “I know that I speak for the German people when I
warmly thank and proudly acknowledge the officers and troops who answered my
call and defended our territories with heroic courage at risk to their own lives.”23
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That “heroic courage” culminated with the extermination of some 65,000 Herero
and 10,000 Nama people, an eighty percent and fifty percent depopulation,
respectively.24
With the completion of their genocidal goals in 1907, German settlers
experienced less than a decade of “prosperity,” during which they were permitted
to use Herero and Nama laborers for work on their plantations and construction
projects. These laborers were the last survivors of the concentration camps that
were finally closed in the last year of the conflict. Signifying their status with a
metal disc worn around the neck, the exploited Herero and Nama peoples were
forbidden from owning land or cattle and existed only in their role as manual
workers. While this short era was a time of misery for the indigenous peoples,
German settlers thrived in such a way that, years after the territory had been lost to
war and the Treaty of Versailles, later regimes would tap into this nostalgia and
“the memory of German South-West Africa and the era of the ‘settler paradise’
between the Herero and Nama genocides and World War I.”25 The use of this
nostalgia, in conjunction with the racist tropes employed by the colonial
administration, would become a powerful tool, particularly in the repertoire of Nazi
Germany, who would brazenly employ the appropriation of national identity,
culture, and memory to validate their racial ideology. While the validation of this
ideology was reliant at least in part on such nostalgia, its implementation was fully
reliant on the realization of genocide. To this end, historian Shelley Baranowski
points out that while “the colonial army’s pacification in the name of security at the
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very least carried genocidal potential…Nazism’s ideological project, the racial
remaking of its Lebensraum largely unchecked by dissent at home, created its own
unique agent.”26 This lack of dissent at home was partially mirrored during the
Kaiserreich by many high-ranking officials like Alfred von Schlieffen and the
Kaiser himself, even as the SPD vehemently opposed the methods employed by
von Trotha. The elections that followed the genocide would be marked as the only
time in German history where the SPD actually lost seats in the Reichstag due to
their opposition to the Herero and Nama genocide.
While Europeans failed to voice sufficient objection to the horrors visited
on the Herero and Nama peoples, the indigenous populations did not suffer the
same reticence. With 1915 marking the loss of Southwest Africa from German
control to the invasion of South Africa under British command, 1919 marked the
year in which Namibia became a de facto “fifth province” of South Africa. Over
the following years, South Africa enforced considerable executive authority over
their mandate territory, even going so far as to introduce apartheid in conjunction
with the rise of the South African National Party. In response to these increasingly
authoritarian actions, both the Herero and Nama leadership bodies submitted
complaints to the United Nations, which went largely unheard until 1988 when
Namibia finally won her independence. The genocide that had so terribly
redesigned Namibia’s demographic and cultural landscape had been recognized as
such by the U.N. only three years earlier. Since that time, relations between
Germany and Namibia have been strained, as the former avoided issuing a formal
apology for nearly twenty years after the recognition of the genocide while the latter
has filed multiple lawsuits demanding reparations and the return of property to
descendants of the victims. Many of these lawsuits are ongoing still today, while
others have resulted in compromised compensation and the delayed return of
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certain relics from German universities.27 Ultimately, the legacy of this genocide
and the war that surrounded it is one of long-lasting resentment and bureaucratic
reticence to right the wrongs of the past. By drawing on this example of cultural
concerns, hurried extemporization, awareness of related events, and industrial
possibilities at work, the Herero and Nama genocide serves as an outline for later,
darker realities.
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Chapter Two: The Ober Ost

Between the Volga River and the Rhine lies a vast stretch of land south of the Baltic
Sea and north of the Adriatic in which Ivan Berend of Cambridge University has
observed “similar economic, social, and political structures have established in the
course of European history a distinct region.”28 This region is home to people from
an assortment of ethnic groups, the most prominent of which was the Slavic people.
Although perceived as scattered, divided, and leaderless by their immediate western
neighbors in the Holy Roman Empire and beyond, the peoples of Eastern Europe,
particularly in areas of a Slavic majority, were, in fact, already well established and
economically stable. Nonetheless, much of Central and Eastern Europe was
inundated with German immigrants during the High Middle Ages under the flag of
the expanding Teutonic Knights. The introduction of an entirely new ethnic group,
particularly one that rivaled the preexisting majority, put considerable stress on the
demographic of Eastern Europe. While German émigrés regarded their movement
as a fulfillment of Ostsiedlung, their predestined expansion into the East as
promised and encouraged by the Teutonic Order, many indigenous groups felt
crowded and were agitated by the influx of new people. For decades, many
historians regarded this influx as not just a physical movement of people but also a
movement of ideas, culture, and social structures. While this belief was true to a
certain degree, Eastern Europe had already established cities, laws, and a rich
culture of folklore for itself before any German immigrant had crossed their
borders. Nonetheless, Ostsiedlung did reshape much of the societal structure of the
region by introducing German town law, in which urban dwellers were granted
certain property rights, personal freedoms, and trade protections from foreign
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merchants. Though initially offered only to ethnic Germans, these laws were soon
expanded to include all inhabitants, regardless of ethnicity. Ethnic identity did not
dissipate with the inclusion of non-German peoples in the new town law, however.
Indeed, the relationship between ethnic identity and fervent loyalty to one’s land
was not foreign to Eastern Europe, but, whereas this relationship had manifested
itself as nationalism in the West over the course of the nineteenth century, such a
concept was inherently more difficult to create and convey between the disparate
peoples of the East, resulting in a disunity that was repeatedly exploited by foreign
powers in the modern era. In Poland however, a conscious national identity had
been created in response to this continuous foreign intervention and manipulation,
so that “to be a Pole…meant to be cognizant of the past, to recognize the existence
of a community shaped by a common history, culture, language, and faith (or some
combination of the above).”29 Cognizance of this common community, which
became characteristic in almost every area of the continent, would become the most
important societal development in modern Europe.
The idea of the common community, linked by shared history, language,
and culture, was a concept that was rapidly circulating in the late eighteenth century
during the French Revolution before gaining enormous traction and popularity
across Europe in reaction to the spread of the First French Empire under Napoleon.
The term “nationalism” had already been coined in 1772 by Prussian scholar
Johann Gottfried Herder in his “Treatise on the Origin of Language,” in which he
emphasized the crucial importance of language in the construction of a national
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identity and the cognizance of the human spirit.30 Herder expounded on this ideal
in other works as well, asserting that “the time [is] coming when we shall return in
earnest to our language, to the merits, to the principles and goals of our fathers and
learn therefore to value our own gold.”31 Hardly three years after Herder’s death,
German statesman Johann Fichte called on French-occupied Berlin, and to all
German-speakers abroad, to distinguish themselves from their geographic
neighbors in other countries, saying that any country that “wishes to absorb and
mingle with itself any other people of different descent and language, cannot do so
without itself becoming confused…and violently disturbing the even progress of
its culture.”32 In the vein of these early proponents of nationalism were figures like
Ernst Moritz Arndt and Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl, both of whom were supporters of
a romanticized German agrarian state in which the rural Volk were viewed as the
most genuine Germans and thus the personification of the true German spirit. The
field of ethnography lent itself to the support of nationalist ideals by circulating
pseudoscientific concepts about race that relied heavily on stereotypes, ignorance,
and religion-based fears. The interest of German political, philosophical, and
scholarly figures in the creation of a national identity hearkens back centuries to the
Thirty Years War of the early seventeenth century, which left a lasting mark on the
German psyche by instilling an enduring fear of foreign domination and
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exploitation, as well as a subsequent need for unification and protection. With the
occupation of the French during the Napoleonic Wars, this centuries-old fear was
rekindled and finally realized in 1871, largely through the machinations of Prussian
statesman Otto von Bismarck.
Under Bismarck’s nominal rule from Unification to 1890, Germany
pursued a course of foreign diplomacy characterized by the concepts of realpolitik,
a pragmatic approach to “real world politics” regardless of ideology, morals, or
ethics. Concurrent with this diplomatic style was the hope held by many that “the
new Germany was but the first stage in the achievement of a dominion that would
extend beyond its present borders to include ethnic Germans scattered throughout
Europe, a realm that would reach as far as Constantinople and the Black Sea.”33
Although Bismarck was resistant even to the idea of building an overseas empire,
he nevertheless agreed to its creation by hosting the Berlin Conference of 1884-85,
which would ultimately lead to Germany’s short but bloody control of East Africa
and Southwest Africa. Yet despite Bismarck’s careful construction and
maintenance of a complex system of treaties, alliances, and agreements with all of
the major powers and many minor powers in Europe, he was summarily replaced
by a series of weaker politicians who bowed to the newly crowned Kaiser’s political
ideations, which included an abrupt shift away from Bismarck’s defensive
realpolitik in favor of the more aggressive Weltpolitik. Under the Kaiser’s new
leadership, Germany relentlessly pursued acquisition of overseas territories while
also adopting a more assertive diplomatic approach to their continental neighbors.
This pugnacious attitude was undeniably provoked by Germany’s wholehearted
adherence to the principles of “nationalism, the civic religion of the new state,
[which] reflected the centrality of military values, as well as an aggressive
confidence in Germany’s growing industrial power and the conviction that German
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influence in the world ought to correspond to the country’s economic might.”34 By
1914, tensions on the continent were brought to a head with the assassination of the
Austrian archduke by a Serbian nationalist sect. Within weeks of the assassination,
the complex web of alliances and treaties that had so characterized foreign
diplomacy for the last several decades were called into action, and Europe was once
again at war with itself. For the peoples of Eastern Europe, World War I was hardly
the exciting prospect hailed by the West. The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
had not been kind to the region, which had suffered under continued divisions and
rule by foreign powers while simultaneously upholding the “industrialized,
urbanized, and educated West…[as] a far away, admired, envied, and hated
promised land for the agricultural, rural, partly illiterate peasant societies of the
East.”35 Indeed, while nations like Britain, France, Germany, and Belgium had
continued to exercise their imperial muscles and enjoy ever-rising prosperity, the
failure of achieving an equal status in the East resulted in the “extreme ideologies
and political trends that emerged in turn-of-the-century Central and Eastern
Europe…all of [which] repudiated the West and rejected the previous imitative road
of development.”36 Instead, despite being dramatically unprepared for modern
warfare and ardently wishing to avoid such a conflict, the lands of Eastern Europe,
particularly Poland, which were ruled at the time by Tsarist Russia, would find
themselves front and center for the duration of the nearly four-and-a-half-year
campaign.
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While World War I is often remembered in the West for its static trench
borders that never wavered more than a few miles in either direction over the course
of the war, the border in the East was a different matter altogether. This boundary
was a fluid line, bulging and shrinking hundreds of miles as the Germans and
Austro-Hungarians struggled against the Russians and their Eastern European
holdings. Yet for much of the war, Germany held control of vast swaths of eastern
territory, each section of which was organized and governed differently; but none
were governed more ruthlessly than the parts of present-day Lithuania, Latvia,
Belarus, Poland, and Courland that made up the zone under the control of the
Oberbefehlshaber, known as the Ober Ost. The Ober Ost, effectively controlled by
Erich Ludendorff until 1916 and then by the Bavarian Prince Maximilian until the
end of the war, operated as a formal military occupation that had replaced the
previous Russian presence while allowing the native Polish administration to
remain intact, though powerless. Driven by a multitude of motivations ranging from
militaristic strategy to deeply embedded ideals about eastward expansion, the
Germans hoped to create a model state in which native Slavs would be elevated to
the standards of their German occupiers while also making room for German
immigrants to the East. To prepare the land for its intended purpose, the Germans
divided the region into three districts, in each of which were implemented two
policies of occupation identified in Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius’s work The German
Myth of the East: Verkehrspolitik and Deutsche Arbeit. The policy of
Verkehrspolitik restricted the movement of the native population between the
districts and called for forced labor and the expropriation of available resources;
yet “while Verkehrspolitik controlled the land, borders, and movement, a program
of Kultur would accomplish the same on the spiritual plane, controlling entire

peoples, their national identities, and future development.”37 Stemming from early
racial ideologies about Slavic ethnic groups that would provide a later basis for the
Nazi ethos, the cultural concept of Deutsche Arbeit promoted the purification of
Eastern societies and cultures through integration with the German model. Toward
this end, “the army devoted astonishing effort in time of war to cultural
improvement behind the front: newspapers in native languages, publication of
dictionaries, folk museums, school regulations, archaeological and historical
investigations, and theatre.”38 As a result of these conflicting policies and the
positioning of the Eastern Front, the Ober Ost and much of occupied Poland were
ravaged over four long years.
The reality of German occupation could often be much different than the
original aims and concepts proposed by the racial narrative of German ideology
about the East. The term Verkehrspolitik itself is a reference to the ominously
panoptic possibilities at play; difficult to assign to a single definition in English, the
root “verkehr” refers to “traffic, movement, communications and relations, or (most
broadly) any kind of interaction.”39 Such interaction went beyond simply
determining where the indigenous peoples could and could not go to include the
acquisition of manufactured resources, the movement of raw materials, and the
mobilization of troops. By operating under such a broad term, the German military
acted with the freedom to secure each of these factors while also addressing
reconstruction efforts and partisan uprisings, all with the ultimate goal of permanent
ownership of the land via colonialization. Of course, while “many competing
interests, economic, political, and financial, were to be taken into consideration in
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forming policies, [sic] the overrising interest in any instance was always the army’s
demand for security and ‘ordered circumstances.”40 The decisions made in the
name of this policy were handled by an administrative section of the same name
and in conjunction with other offices as demanded by the incredibly ambitious
concerns of the policy. As a result, no section of the Ober Ost’s administrative body
was spared involvement or fulfillment of Verkehrspolitik. The impact this had on
the people who had lived in the area now controlled by the Germans was deep and
lasting, from the creation of fixed resource prices to the drive of Polish laborers to
German farms in the West, but not altogether unique. Even in the lands of the
Entente, residents of “enemy origin” were treated with distrust and suspicion in
ways that often manifested in movement policies that echoed that of the Ober Ost.
In Scotland at the very start of the war, a German woman, Edith Herring, was
arrested for traveling outside her permitted five-mile radius, despite her claims that
she attempted to procure a travel pass. Nevertheless, Herring was arrested and
sentenced to five days in prison before being sent back to Germany.41 Native
residents in the Ober Ost were not granted the same treatment, since their enemies
resided in their own lands. Yet the all-encompassing movement policy was not the
only occupation strategy employed by the Germans.
While Verkehrspolitik was adopted as a means of controlling the movement
of people, resources, and information in the East, a project of Kultur was employed
to accomplish the same reordering of the people’s identities. When the German
army came into possession of their new lands, the overwhelming reaction of the
German military can be welded into a single descriptive term for the whole region:
Unkultur, or the lack of any recognizable culture.
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materialized in the Deutsche Arbeit policy and prompted the creation of an ethnic
missionary cult, which was bent on merging Eastern identity with proper German
culture to create a new regional self-concept that was reliant on German influence
and reinforced the narrative of their own racial preeminence. In the works of
various German writers, including Thomas Mann, the concept of Kultur was
identified and touted as “an organic, rooted, idealistic, and authentic expression of
the creative essence of German national character. By contrast, the Latin word
‘civilization’ stood for artificial, merely technical achievements of a soulless
western way of life, embodied by the decadent French and the coldly mercantile
British.”42 In fact, the term Kultur stems from the Latin word colere, meaning to
cultivate, which brings to mind Kiernan’s genocidal trend of agriculture by
summoning “the image of the helmeted German soldier sowing in the East.”43 The
image of the farming soldier representing the best of true German culture would
only grow to mythic proportions in the decades following World War I. The revival
of Ostsiedlung, the medieval emigration of Germanic peoples into Eastern Europe,
was yet another echo of this colonial desire that grew louder with the creation of a
“demarcation line to the East which coincided largely with the easternmost line
held by the medieval Teutonic Knights—a coincidence, which gave the more
romantic among the German officers the feeling of guarding once more the West
against the East.”44 To this end, the German occupation forces dedicated themselves
to creating order and cultivation in order to create a positive image of German
Work, define native identity, and contextualize the meaning of the German
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presence in the East, so that the Ober Ost would remain a German holding for time
without end.
The interaction of ideology and action is precisely the place in which reality
and meaning find a common root. While the ideologies fueling the actions taken in
the Ober Ost were highly reminiscent of those invoked in Southwest Africa, and
later by the National Socialists, from the near-divinely inspired pursuit of territory
to the racialized preconceptions toward the indigenous populations, the Ober Ost
never descended into genocide despite the nominal presence of each of Kiernan’s
genocidal trends. The obsession with agriculture, fertile soil, and genetic
predispositions toward cultivation manifests itself in the Ober Ost not only in
Liulevicius’s image of the soldier-farmer working to “civilize” the “barbaric” East
for the benefit of all the ethnic Germans living outside the Fatherland, but also in
Theodore Abel’s account of the farmer’s story, in which the subject recounted how
“the greater our need became, the more deeply the farmer attached himself to the
soil. Everyone felt that if he had to leave the soil his life would be destroyed,
uprooted.”45 Closely related to this obsession, the drive for expansion was evident
in Germany’s war aims and military strategy that led them to occupy this massive
territory, just as the concerns of ancestral precedent urged them to redeem lost land
and legend. Military giants like Ludendorff and Hindenburg were far from the only
ones in support of this territorial expansion: “as the antidote to the Polish ‘flood’
and as the protectors of German communities outside the Reich’s borders
threatened by ‘Russidication’ or ‘Magyarization,’ the Pan Germans stood at the
forefront in pushing for the continental consolidation of ethnic Germans in one
polity.”46 Yet the racism that had dominated interaction between colonists and the
colonized in the southern hemisphere reappeared in a milder format just a decade
45
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later. Roger Chickering admits that “aspects of German rule during the First World
War did anticipate the Nazi ‘population policy’ of the next war, the attempt to
reengineer society in the occupied lands according to racial principles;” however,
the goal of German occupation during World War I was the harnessing of economic
resources for the good of the civilized Volk.47 Though still disparaging, critical, and
exploitative, interactions between the German occupiers and the occupied peoples
was not inherently genocidal or systematically orchestrated to be violent and
bloody. The very nature of Germany’s occupation was fundamentally different
from its earlier and later incarnations, as their aim was to elevate the East to German
standards of culture and society rather than dedicated to the exploitation and
eventual erasure of the indigenous populations.
At the same time that Germany’s military was struggling with their goals of
cultivating and civilizing the perceived barbarity of the Eastern regions, it was also
dealing with a war on two fronts that was slowly sapping the country’s life,
resources, and will to fight. While fighting in the west had ground down to a static
war of attrition, fighting in the east remained highly intense and mobile until the
withdrawal of Russia from the conflict. The massive country’s surrender came after
more than a year of dissatisfaction, mutiny, and political upheaval that finally
culminated with the infamous October Revolution that saw the ascension of the
Bolshevik Party to the most powerful institutions in Russia. Though remembered
today as a singular event of 1917, the Bolshevik Revolution was an uprising that
took years to fully realize, involving millions of lives from the conscription of the
Red Army to the effects of widespread legal revision. More immediately, however,
the Bolsheviks directed their energies at extracting Russia from the conflict on the
European continent with all due haste, an urgency which forced the new regime to
sign the draconian Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The infamous treaty, signed after only
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two months deliberation, detailed Soviet Russia’s renunciation of obligations to the
Entente as well as its relinquishment of the Baltic States, Finland, Belarus, and
Ukraine, while Poland was ignored entirely. The loss of these territories, as well as
the revolution itself, served as the effective end of the Russian Empire, if only in
name; in the following years, the Red Army would regain the vast majority of these
lost lands. In the aftermath of the War in the East, the removal of Soviet Russia
from the struggle was meant to bring an end to armed conflict in the East, but the
violence of the First World War continued to plague the entire region for years
afterward in the form of new conflicts, like the Russian Civil War and the PolishSoviet War, as well as the presence of the German Freikorps. Each of these sources
of conflict would contribute to the social and political makeup of Eastern Europe
during the Interwar Period.
From the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk to the coordinated attack on
Poland in 1939, Eastern Europe endured the Interwar Period to varying degrees of
independence and unease. While the immediate aftermath of the war was largely
composed of even more war, by the mid-1920s, the region had mostly settled into
a tenuous sort of peace. The Polish-Soviet War was perhaps the most significant of
these post-World War conflicts, having evolved initially out of a border dispute and
then into an all-out offensive by the Polish Army looking to create an Intermarium,
or a confederation of states to stand against the great powers of Germany and Soviet
Russia. The short but brutal conflict ended in Soviet defeat with the signing of a
treaty in Riga. While the dream of Jozéf Piłsudski, the Polish Chief of State, for an
Intermarium was never realized, and indeed, all the countries Piłsudski had hoped
to unite were under Nazi or Soviet control by 1940, the conflict was instrumental
in curbing Vladimir Lenin’s ambitions to expand communism across the European
continent. Equally instrumental in the curbing of this ambition was the reality of
civil war in Soviet Russia. The new government struggled to assert itself across the
vast stretch of its territory for a full four years before it finally achieved a semblance

of control in 1922. Germany’s post-war experiences were no better, crippled as it
was by domestic displeasure, abandonment by the elite, and the effects of the Treaty
of Versailles, which had mandated the removal of German presence from their
oversea holdings, demilitarization of the Rhineland, payment of reparations to
Britain and France, and finally, acceptance of responsibility for having initiated the
war. The effects of these treaty tenets would harden the attitude of the German
populace into one of resentment and revenge, a sentiment that certain charismatic
politicians would tap into in the coming decades. Indeed, this reality would only
exacerbate the pathos of victimhood that had already so colored the experience of
Germans since the seventeenth century. With the relentless developments of
military technology pushing the bounds of what was considered possible, the
continued occupation of all other European powers in their respective colonial
holdings, and the failed results of this last episode of frantic administrative
formulation, the Ober Ost lends itself glaringly to the development of the next stage
in the German imperial experience.

Chapter Three: The General Government

The Interwar Period, spanning the scant two decades between the conclusion of the
First World War and the commencement of the Second, was by no means a quiet
time for Germany, despite the nominal lack of warfare. Having been saddled with
the unfortunate and unpopular responsibility of negotiating the Treaty of Versailles
with the victorious Entente, the Social Democrats were hard-pressed to generate
sympathy or support for the new administration in Weimar. Instead, the party was
viewed as traitors to the Fatherland who had bowed to the cruelty and exploitation
of Britain and France and were ultimately, along with women and Jews, the reason
for Germany’s defeat in the war. This fabricated account of the nation’s defeat,
known today as the Dolchstosslegende, was largely propagated by those truly
culpable: the conservative military elite who had so determinedly ignored the
reality of their situation and thus failed their people. As such, many of these figures
escaped the consequences of their actions, retaining their heroic reputation,
particularly in the case of Paul von Hindenburg, Chief of the General Staff from
1916 to the end of the war. With their support rapidly diminishing in the face of
continued hardships like the hyperinflation of 1923, the Social Democrats
eventually yielded to Hindenburg’s still-intact popularity, throwing their support
with the man’s presidential run in 1925. That year and the following year saw a
significant reversal in Germany’s political fortunes with the signing of the Locarno
Treaty, which necessitated friendly relations with France, followed by the
admittance of Germany into the League of Nations. Yet even these hard-won
victories could not turn the tide of German sentiment in favor of the Weimar
Republic.
Even as the Social Democrats and their new conservative allies labored to
rejuvenate the German economy and spirit, the sentiments that had fueled warfare
and imperialism in previous decades festered in the hearts of ethnic Germans living

outside of the Fatherland. Many of these individuals channeled their frustrations
and insecurities into rabid nationalism; one such individual was Adolf Hitler.
Having served in the German Army during WWI, Hitler was well acquainted with
the sentiments that had so shaped German military culture for decades. It was this
knowledge that kept Hitler in military service after the war, which led him to join
the German Workers’ Party in 1919. Over the next four years, Hitler took control
of the party and, in November of 1923, launched an unsuccessful coup that
ultimately gave him a platform to project his hyper-nationalistic, anti-Semitic
message to the whole of Bavaria and beyond. Though held in prison for a year and
a half, Hitler used the time to dictate his infamous autobiography Mein Kampf, from
which millions of Germans would draw ideological inspiration in the following
years. The rhetoric of Mein Kampf, in combination with the discontent of the
German masses under the effects of the Versailles Treaty, would be exploited over
the 1920s and 30s to generate further resentment toward Hitler’s chosen scapegoat:
the Jew. The fueling of this racialized hatred would ultimately evolve into a
continental civil war and racial war “that combined contemptuous stereotypes of
long-standing, a loathing of the Bolshevik Revolution, and the wrenching impact
of World War I and its aftermath, which exacerbated German perceptions of foreign
dominations and ethic contamination.”48 With Hitler’s rise to the Chancellorship in
1933, the prospect of a dual war became reality.
Once appointed Chancellor of Germany, Hitler’s move to assert total
control over the German state was startlingly swift. Barely a month after his
appointment, the Reichstag was set ablaze under mysterious circumstances and
used to push through the Enabling Act, which granted Hitler widespread
authoritative power and suspended civil rights for German citizens. This act was
merely the tipping point that triggered the beginning of the end for German Jews.
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Anti-Semitism, the centuries-old hatred against the Jewish people that took on
pseudoscientific racialized qualifiers under the Nazis, was one of two primary
cornerstones of National Socialist ideology alongside pro-Aryanism. This ideology
was a virulent mutation of the nineteenth century’s Völkish movement, which
promoted an organic sense of German essence and, though “often at odds with
modernity, was fueled by industrialization and social dislocations.”49 In the Nazi
sense however, the movement took on epically racist overtones that would spawn
the Nuremburg Laws of 1935, which detailed how Hitler and his myrmidons
viewed the Volk and the Jewish Question. The Nuremburg Laws were, in fact, the
second in a series of four collective deaths for German Jews identified by the
historian Christopher Browning in his book The Origins of the Final Solution.50 In
his scholarship, Browning points out four separate instances that chip away at the
rights and freedoms of German Jews living in the Third Reich. The first attack on
the Jewish people came in 1933, scant months after the passage of the Enabling
Act, with the clearing of the Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil
Service, which ousted all practicing Jews from government-sponsored jobs,
becoming the first civic death of German Jewry. The Nuremburg Laws that came
two years later represented the social death of the Jews, who were no longer
permitted access to public houses, libraries, theatres, city swimming pools, or even
simple park benches. Although the signs that had been erected to reinforce these
laws were quietly tucked away for the 1936 Berlin Olympics, resentment toward
the Jewish population returned with fervor in 1938 with Kristallnacht, the economic
attack that destroyed thousands of Jewish homes and businesses in Berlin. The
final, physical death came with the onslaught of the Einsatzgruppen and the
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implementation of the Final Solution in January of 1942. Yet for all their
ideological vitriol toward the Jewish people, the process of developing a broad
support base for their party was much more concentrated on the latter cornerstone
of their tenets: pro-Aryanism.
Both major pillars of National Socialist ideals rested on a pseudoscientific
racism that had been developed over the course of previous colonial encounters, yet
the pillar that mandated exaltation of the “Aryan” people also required careful
cultivation in order to build popular support with the German people. While the
concept of an Aryan people initially began as a phenotypical descriptor, the legal
definition of the term was not granted until the 1935 Nuremburg Laws and the
mandated creation of the Ahnenpass. Nevertheless, the idea of “Germanness” had
been in circulation for centuries despite the fact that the unified German state was
a recent creation of the previous century. German identity had instead been created
by and survived on a rich collection of folklore that constituted a people’s customs,
songs, dances, art forms, holidays, heroes, horrors, and language. In conjunction
with stories, each of these individual components makes up the complete
compendium of folklore, which remains fluid according to the memories and
experiences of the community to which it belongs. With such a rich and diverse
body of folkloric customs already available, the Nazis were able to tap into a potent
sense of nostalgia to invoke the blessing of Germanic heroes and historical figures
in order to create a sense of credibility and national heritage. Tales like the Pied
Piper of Hamelin are a cogent example of the ease with which a story can be
changed, modified, or misremembered. Without a written canon, the plot,
characters, and, most importantly, lesson can vary widely from version to version,
even to the extent of shifting characters from villain to hero and vice versa. While
not initially a startling prospect, the ability of folkloric fairytales to shift meaning
is highly troubling when considering that folklore is, at its root, a reflection of a
community’s values and history. To this end, the National Socialists of Germany

capitalized on the preexisting body of folklore in German-speaking regions to
create a false narrative of ethnic consciousness and cultural identity that extended
beyond the border of Germany by dictating who could claim heritage with this
identity and who could not.
Ideological pillars aside, the Nazis’ early energy was poured purposely and
carefully into dismantling and defying the hated tenets of Versailles, all in an effort
to rally popular support and prepare Germany for the war that would launch it into
global hegemony. Initially, Hitler and his myrmidons worked quietly and subtly to
rearm the military and reintroduce conscription. Then, in 1936, the Nazis moved
openly to remilitarize the Rhineland, a direct contravention of one of the major
Versailles provisions. Only two years later, Hitler flouted yet another of the major
clauses of the treaty with the Anschluss of Austria in March of 1938 and the
annexation of the Sudetenland later that year. Although both Britain and France
objected to such actions as contrary to Versailles, neither country was willing to
back up their displeasure with arms. Despite what historians of today would call
ample warning, the Nazis were left to pursue their coveted Lebensraum, land
sufficient for the needs of ethnic Germans, by negotiating a Non-Aggression Pact
with the Soviet Union that ultimately spawned the Second World War. On
September 1, 1939, the German and Soviet armies launched separate, coordinated
assaults on the Polish nation, rapidly dividing and conquering the country in five
short weeks. With Poland’s invasion and partition completed, the Nazis initiated a
harsh system of elimination that targeted the Polish elite, including military
officers, priests, intellectual figures, and political and aristocratic leaders. Such an
attack was, as Shelley Baranowski asserted in Nazi Empire, “an ideologically
motivated total war aimed at the destruction of the Polish nation.”51 Nazi soldiers
were not the only ones to engage in this slaughter. Soviet officers also targeted
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Polish nationalists in a massacre now named for the forest in which many of the
mass graves were later discovered: Katyn. The consequences of France and
Britain’s willful ignorance of the danger presented by Nazi Germany would collude
the West in the deaths of millions of innocent people across the globe.
The Nazi drive to the East was an ideologically motivated ambition, crafted
and honed by centuries of German concepts and imaginings about Eastern Europe.
The idea of divide and conquer within the Polish lands was not a new one, neither
in terms of concept, as explored within the colonial holdings of the Kaiserreich, nor
location, as evidenced by the 1915 proposal Land ohne Menschen that cleaved to
the idea of a German colonial destiny in the East.52 Therefore, “the Nazis were thus
certainly not the first German nationalists to think of radical solutions for the Polish
problem through colonization and expulsion.”53 Yet even as German nationalists
idealized and romanticized the vast possibilities for prosperity in the East, the
people who already lived there were viewed with a disparagement that bordered
them on subhuman. As during World War I, invading German soldiers felt that they
had entered a land devoid of recognizable culture, but whereas the soldiers of WWI
had resolved to build up Eastern culture to German “standards,” the soldiers of
WWII resolved to expel, enslave, or exterminate the many distinct ethnic groups
that called the vast region of Eastern Europe home. Since much of the mythology
surrounding German ideas about Eastern Europe were based on tales from the
Teutonic Knights and the German immigrants who settled there in the Middle Ages,
the Nazis established a German Ethnic Registry constructed of four classification
to distinguish those of sufficient “Germanness” by applying a complicated range of
“linguistic, anthropological, eugenic, and political criteria, whereby hereditary
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health, political activism on behalf of German causes, fluency in the German
language, and other cultural markers…resulted in the highest ranking.”54
As with nearly every angle adopted by the Nazis, the Registry did not initially enjoy
a smooth implementation but rather was introduced piecemeal through multiple ad
hoc committees in different regions over nearly a year and a half. This system of
ethnic ranking showed just how different the coming occupation of Eastern Europe
would be than the previous enterprise. This time there would be no Germanization
of the indigenous peoples; instead those whose “German blood could be extracted
from the human residue that remained from the medieval German migrations and
the conquests of the Hanseatic traders and Teutonic Knights” would return to the
Reich to wash away any remaining Slavism while those who were deemed
otherwise would be left to work, starve, or be expelled.55 There would soon prove
to be far more of the latter.
The organization of Eastern Europe under the Nazi Regime involved the
implementation of a policy plan known as Generalplan Ost, which called for the
ethnic cleansing of Eastern Europe to prepare it for colonization by ethnic Germans.
Combining the ideologies of Lebensraum with Drang nach Osten, the plan was
never fully utilized during the war due to Germany’s defeat; however, millions of
civilian deaths can still be attributed to its earlier Kleine Planung. This first version
of the plan, to be carried out while invasion was underway, called for the removal
of several million people from the Baltic states, whose political lines would be
subsequently wiped out. In order to conduct their racial war in the East, Germany
employed the use of not only the Wehrmacht but also special tasks forces called the
Einsatzgruppen and auxiliary police battalions, which “emerged as capable
instruments of annihilation…[as well as] proved equally important in the
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subjugation and governance of the areas under German civil administration.”56
Once an occupation force had been established in Poland, the systematic institution
of requisitioning land, labor, and resources began with the annihilation of political,
military, and religious figures in an attempt to stamp out the carriers of Polish
nationalism. Following this atrocity, the occupiers turned their focus to rounding
up the Jews and shunting them into hastily established urban ghettos or massacring
them outright in forests, ravines, and ditches, a prospect made easier by “the belief
held by the Wehrmacht and SS commanders alike that all Jews were communists
and partisans.”57 In tandem with this belief were the brutal reprisals put in place by
the Nazi occupation forces, which designated that any Pole caught aiding or
abetting a Jew would be put to death, a decree which existed nowhere else in the
whole of Nazi-occupied Europe. This early part of the war in the East, which was
characterized by mass executions like the one at Babi Yar in September of 1941, in
which more than 33,000 Jews were put to death, was poorly documented and
largely only remembered by the soldiers who carried them out or, as once again in
the case of Babi Yar, unauthorized photographers like Johannes Hähle.58 Yet as the
war ground on, Nazi elites began to search in earnest for a more economical method
of murder.
The entrance of America into the war and the army’s failure to put a quick
end to the Soviet menace led Hitler’s myrmidons to gather at the villa at Wannsee
in January of 1942 to determine a more efficient approach to genocide. The
infamous conference lasted all of ninety minutes, during which the fifteen members
present, who “represented the SS and police bodies, the NSDAP, a number of
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ministries and the occupying administrations in the areas of Eastern Europe under
German rule,” determined the fate of Europe’s remaining Jewish population.59
These fifteen members, headed by Reinhard Heydrich and Adolf Eichmann, vowed
to give their unconditional support to the new Final Solution to the Jewish Question.
This solution accounted for the treatment of all Jews within Europe, from fullblooded practicing Jews to the children of second-degree Mischlinge. Those found
to be sufficiently German would be welcomed as full members of the Reich, while
those who were not were to be summarily executed in concentration camps via
exhaustion, starvation, exposure, or disease. Although “freedom through work” had
initially been held as the primary method of extermination, the assassination of the
Conference’s chief architect, Reinhard Heydrich, by Czech partisans in June of that
year instigated the creation of the Aktion Reinhard death camps, whose sole
function would be the immediate execution of incoming prisoners. From 1942 until
late in 1944, the Final Solution was worked out “over pits, in gas vans, and at the
death facilities at Chełmno, Bełźec, Sobibór, Treblinka, Majdanek, and
Auschwitz.”60 The creation of the Final Solution is sometimes referred to the
“twisted path to Auschwitz,” and indeed it aptly underlines the radical
improvisation so unique to German imperialism, wherein the method and the means
are often obscured until administrators arrive at it. While Auschwitz remains the
darkest shadow of the Holocaust with the highest death toll, its infamy lies in part
due to the simple fact that it remains standing. Unlike the death camps of Sobibór,
Treblinka, and Bełżec, Auschwitz never stopped running until the Red Army was
nearly at its doorstep. The three Reinhard camps had completed their assigned task;
there were no more lives left to end.
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By 1944, it was clear that Nazi Germany was on the run, being driven back
across the territories it had stolen by the combined might of the Red Army and the
Western Allies. Yet even as the Wehrmacht and its auxiliary entities retreated, the
bloody work of the Holocaust was not abandoned. Instead, marginal concentration
camps were emptied in anticipation of enemy liberation, where “their inmates were
either killed, allowed to die on pointless death marches or herded into other camps
inside the Reich, where overcrowding, overwork, the lack of supplies, disease and
the brutality of the guards soon caused the mortality rate to soar.”61 It was this final
stage that saw the Nazi war machine at its most destructive, bloodily sputtering
across its now lost territories while cannibalizing itself as the doctrines it was built
upon came crashing down. Had the Reich not been beaten back across Europe, the
final stage of the Generalplan Ost would have been realized in the starvation,
ejection, and enslavement of some thirty million Slavs so that the final dream of
the Nazi Empire might be realized: Germanization of the East.
The determination to adopt both the Generalplan Ost and the resolution of
the Wannsee Conference marked the greatest divergence from the precedent set by
occupation during World War I, which had always stopped far short of outright
systematic extermination, and even colonialism in Southwest Africa. This time,
Eastern occupation came to resemble the even older imperial precedent set by the
continent of Europe as a whole, despite a new record of cruelty being set with the
first mass gassings of European Jews by the regional leader of Western Poland.62 It
was toward this ultimatum that every aspect of the imperialist genocide enacted
throughout Eastern Europe was driven, based on the claims of scientific racism, the
ancient promise of a blood bond with the soil, and the draw of the Eastern
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breadbasket as the Nazis plundered and razed Eastern Europe in the drive toward
commerce, civilization, and community.
The terrible, grinding, bleeding horror of the European Theatre finally
ended with the suicide of Adolf Hitler and the capitulation of Germany just days
later. The whole of the war had claimed the lives of sixty million people in total,
three percent of the planet, including not just soldiers but also untold millions of
innocent civilians. It represents the deadliest conflict in human history and the first
time in which a global trial was held to determine the punitive culpability of the
survivors. These trials, held in the same city that had seen the birth of the first
formal racial laws of the regime, lasted nearly a full year and tried only twenty-four
of the highest ranking remaining Nazi elite, including Hermann Göring. Although
the trials represented one of the best moments of cooperation among the Allies,
tensions between the capitalist West and the communist East would soon prove
more lasting. By 1948, the capitol city of Berlin had been partitioned between East
and West with the rest of the country soon to succeed. More than forty years of
division would follow, during which the two sides of Germany would advance in
very different ways and at rates that would ultimately stunt their ability to properly
deal with their legacy of racism and genocide. While the memory of Nazi Germany
occupies the vast majority of modern recollections surrounding German history,
Germany’s legacy of genocide and imperialism stretches back far beyond 1933.
The experiences of the Herero and Nama under colonial rule, as well as the people
of Eastern Europe who endured abuse during World War I, demand the right to be
recognized and assigned their proper significance, yet their struggles have been all
but forgotten in the shadow of the Third Reich. Of these three cases of German
imperialism, only two carry the label of genocide, but the suffering experienced by
the victims of all three exhibit common factors of racial aggression, economic
exploitation, and territorial expansion that reject the idea that any part of history
can exist in isolation of the whole. Indeed, the presence of Germany’s obsession

with creating a nationalism based on race, its awareness of the actions of its
neighbors, its phrenetic attempts to make up laws as it operated, and its wanton use
of industrial might to manufacture genocide are more obvious in this case than in
any other, yet their presence is still noteworthy. The differences between Southwest
Africa, the Ober Ost, and the General Government are salient to say the least, but
so too, perhaps even more so, are their terrible similarities.

Conclusion
In attempting to draw conclusions from the connections between the Kaiserreich’s
actions in Southwest Africa, the Ober Ost enterprise, and the Nazi Reich’s General
Government campaign, certain subtle and obvious correlations must be
acknowledged and assessed. Each of these cases are uniquely German for reasons
that can be boiled down to four primary factors: pathos, frantic improvisation,
cognizance of contemporaries, and industrial modernity. Since the Thirty Years
War, ethnic Germans have struggled with a complex of victimhood that only gained
strength under the rule of Napoleon and the failures of 1848. Coupling this fear of
exploitation by their neighbors with the insecurity of their sense of nationalism,
Germany pursued an anxious need to conquer or be conquered, which lent itself
directly to the frantic improvisation that developed in all three cases of imperialism.
This sense of needing to “catch up” promoted the radical violence that became
characteristic of German occupation, which differed so drastically in execution
from Britain’s vaunted “indirect rule” and even from other nations’ use of “direct
rule.” As such, Germany was far from ignorant of its neighbors’ imperial tactics.
Indeed, their desire to keep pace with Britain and France in particular can also be
connected to Germany’s late arrival to the international scene and its desire to be
considered a leading player in global politics and trade. In all three cases, German
administrators took notes from their contemporaries and incorporated them into
their own plans that simultaneously fulfilled their desire to secure their national
identity, while also relied on the massive power of their fully industrialized modern
state. This final factor, Germany’s industrial might, is one that often receives far
too little attention yet is necessary to understanding the magnitude of violence
created by the concerns of the first three factors. Each of these elements combine
and overlap to create a picture of imperialism that is unique to the German

experience and the primary contributors to creating the genocide that characterized
Nazi occupation in the East.
While each case also exhibits certain degrees of the shared themes of
genocide coined by Kiernan, it is important to note that only two of the three
actually qualify for such a moniker. Despite their differences in geography and
regime, both the Herero Genocide and the Holocaust employed racism as a
quantifiable branch of science, able to be proven through anatomical
measurements, and relied on a cult of antiquity to lend legitimacy to their claims
for nationhood and existence. Additionally, neither case wasted time building
schools, hospitals, or new missionaries in either dominated territory, as the single
goal was the conversion of the land to a Germanized agrarian state, possible only
through aggressive expansionism at the price of the racially inferior as dictated by
the norms established by antiquity. Meanwhile, the edicts of the Ober Ost also
exhibited influence from these various themes, whether it was in the culturally
dismissive attitude of the Deutsche Arbeit program or the idolization of the image
of the Teutonic Knight who had fought along these same battle lines in centuries
long past. Yet this chapter of German imperialism was not one that told a story of
genocide. Whereas the General Government and Southwest Africa both rejected
the establishment of buildings and programs that might have aided the native
populace, the Ober Ost did in fact strive to promote schools, theatre, and the media.
The differences therefore, between each of the cases, are just as salient as their
similarities. Each stage in German imperialism represents a different perspective
and interpretation of the goals to be pursued and the paths to be taken in this pursuit.
By recognizing these subtle and obvious connections, both in terms of unifying and
defining characteristics, one can become more adept at recognizing situations in
which violence and destruction are imminent.
To be sure, the themes of imperialism and genocide are far from the only
commonalities at play between these three cases. In fact, all three share key figures

in their related events. The father of Nazi leader Hermann Göring, who served as a
fighter pilot in World War I, acted as the Reichskommissar of German Southwest
Africa, while the future Nazi governor of Bavaria, Franz Ritter, was directly
involved in the genocide of the Herero and Nama peoples. Future rector of the
University of Berlin during the Nazi Regime, Eugen Fischer “carried out his
racialist research in German Southwest Africa, on miscegenation among the mixed
Dutch/Hottentot ‘Rehoboth Bastards.”63 During his time at the University, Fischer
was responsible for supporting the pseudoscience that would later compose the
research of the infamous Josef Mengele. This sharing of culpable figures resulted
also in the shared usage of language when referring to those deemed “unclean,”
“uncivil,” or “savage.” But perhaps one of the most interesting correlations between
each case is the perpetuity of the German victim complex first established by the
outcome of the Thirty Years’ War. This complex would be strengthened by their
later defeat at the hands of Napoleon and their failure to unify in 1848. Having been
constantly overshadowed and overpowered by their more puissant neighbors,
Germans began to cultivate a need for strength in numbers via unification. In order
to defend that unification, there came the drive to conquer or be conquered, as
evidenced by their almost immediate involvement in colonial enterprises in order
to measure up to their French and British rivals. But this desire would ultimately
bring ruin as the outcomes of the Great War, from the starvation wrought on the
German people and the various uprisings in Hamburg and Berlin to the
psychological and political effects of the Treaty of Versailles and fabricated
Stabbed in the Back myth. Each of these factors combined to create an atmosphere
of anger, fear, and suspicion toward fellow Germans and especially toward foreign
powers so that when a new regime rose in Germany that promised to rectify the
mistakes of past eras by citing the culpability of Jews and the belief that too much
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effort “had been lavished on cultivating essentially unchangeable native
populations and close contact with the East had infected the morale of the
occupiers,” it became clear that this new Nazi era would be drawing on examples
closer to Southwest Africa rather than their last failed attempt to cultivate the East.64
This desire to make room for those of good or malleable ethnic background was
only relinquished after the defeat and partition of Germany following World War
II.
But such a legacy of expansion and slaughter cannot simply be ignored or
erased in a single day. Even now, over seventy years after their last imperial
conquest, Germany is still struggling to come to terms with its past and its future,
and it is far from the only nation to struggle to do so. In order to mitigate the
difficulty of the various imperial European powers, the United Nations (U.N.) first
concentrated on the most obvious form of imperialism: the criminalization of
genocide. For all that genocide has occurred many times over the course of human
history, the term itself is actually not yet a century old. Instead, it was coined during
the Second World War by Polish-Jewish lawyer Raphael Lemkin who witnessed
the systematic destruction of his people and understood it to be far more than an act
of war. Lemkin’s definition qualified genocide as the destruction of the political
and social structure of culture, language, nationality, religion, and economy as well
as the destruction of personal security, liberty, health, dignity, and physical life.
Although his definition was eventually rejected and modified, his efforts were
instrumental in organizing the U.N.’s Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the 1948. This convention was pivotal in
establishing a precedent for justice within international courts, based on the opening
of the resolution which stated how “recognizing that at all periods of history
genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity; and being convinced that, in order
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to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge, international co-operation is
required.”65 In part due to the sheer magnitude of the atrocity and also the
inclination toward activism with regards to European brutality, the definition of
genocide was established alongside a universal declaration of human rights in that
same year, which stated that “whereas disregard and contempt for human rights
have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind,
and the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech
and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest
aspiration of the common people.”66 Ignoring the inherent ironies of realizing such
human standards only in retrospect to a largely European humanitarian disaster, the
efforts of the U.N. to quantify such a crime and attach added significance to it were
commendable, and while they have been largely unsuccessful in preventing
genocide, recognition for the crime has certainly increased. In tandem with this
increased awareness is heightened recognition of the need for acknowledgement of
and reparations for the damage wrought by non-genocidal imperial ventures.
Although this has been slow in coming, the process of decolonization grinds on
with each year as more nations return to autonomous rule, for better or worse.
While decolonization has experienced continuous if slow success, the
understanding of how and why these imperial ventures came about is less so,
particularly in the case of the Nazi Holocaust. The dangers of ignoring the
commonalities between different eras and empires are vast. To disregard these
similarities is to blindly believe that humanity always accounts for its actions and
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learns from its mistakes, yet this is glaringly untrue. At the same time, ignorance of
the unifying factors of genocide and empire is not always the culprit behind the
rejection of such; instead, perhaps one of the largest dangers to the integration of
the Nazi Holocaust into the global narrative lies in the ideas promoted by figures
like Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, whose misleading theories serve to undermine his
own efforts to draw attention to the problem of violence based on race and religion.
A former associate professor of government at Harvard University, Goldhagen is
the author of the controversial 1996 work Hitler’s Willing Executioners. Despite
the lack of historical background, Goldhagen’s book works to create a new concept
of eliminationist anti-Semitism, which claims that all ethnic Germans in the
generations preceding World War II were virulently anti-Semitic and thus desirous
of the complete eradication of the Jewish people. By arguing that “the perpetrators
approved of the mass slaughter, that they willingly gave assent to their participation
in the slaughter, is certain [and] that their approval derived in the main from their
conception of Jews is all but certain, for no other source of motivation can plausibly
account for their actions,” Goldhagen’s argument becomes simply ahistorical and
dangerous.67 Anti-Semitism had unfortunately been a matter of course in Europe
since the adoption of Christianity by the Roman Empire, yet Germany was in fact
the land in which Jews had experienced the most social and civic freedoms,
allowing them to flourish in another Renaissance of their own making. To assert
that Germany was a land of rabid anti-Semites, therefore, is a blunt myth. Of course,
it existed, but not to any exceptional degree in comparison with any other European
nation. Moreover, Goldhagen’s deliberate distinction between ethnic Germans and
non-ethnic Germans as perpetrators and Jews and non-Jews as victims
simultaneously erases the complicity of a multitude of occupied European states in
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the organization and execution of the Holocaust, as well as invalidates the suffering
and murder of hundreds of thousands of Roma, Sinti, gay men, disabled people,
and political prisoners, all of whom were targeted for reasons that had little to
nothing to do with anti-Semitism.
Even setting aside the obvious ahistorical nature of Goldhagen’s argument,
his theory also serves to hamstring his effort to underline the horror of the
Holocaust and the genocide of European Jewry by ignoring other motivational
factors at play and creating the appearance that genocide can be avoided by simply
not engaging in anti-Semitic behavior. To reduce the Nazi agenda to a single
isolated cause is to promote the idea that all cases of genocide must operate in the
same fashion, as if to say that since the German people are no longer anti-Semitic,
Hitler will never again kill all the Jews of Europe. To be fair, they are absolutely
correct, but there is nothing to say that the perpetrator must be Hitler or that the
victims must be Jews. Yet despite the proliferation of problematic theories like
Goldhagen’s, the campaign to contextualize the Holocaust is ongoing. Through the
efforts of historians like Ben Kiernan, the Holocaust has been successfully placed
within a global history of genocide that lends meaning and legitimacy to other,
previously ignored cases of horror. However, connecting the Holocaust to its
imperial neighbors is often less explored and less acknowledged, but in order to
understand its significance, an understanding of its predecessors is vital. This
research has attempted to make such connections, not in an effort to mitigate the
severity of the Holocaust but rather to identify the ideologies and practices that
contributed to its birth. By recognizing this family tree of imperialism, the idea that
such acts of horror, be they genocidal or not, are unrepeatable can be successfully
challenged. Perhaps then humanity can take greater steps towards dismantling
systems of oppression and exploitation.
The existence of these systems, however, is very real and unfortunately
experiencing a regrowth in recent years. Turkey, Russia, and North Korea are all

led by parties who exercise near or total control of their states, often with blatant
disregard for the laws of the land. In Turkey, the once popular President Recep
Tayyip Erdoğan has appropriated power with an iron fist through a recent
referendum that has allowed him “wide control over the judiciary, broad powers to
make law by decree, the abolition of the office of the Prime Minister and of
Turkey’s parliamentary system—effectively [making] him a dictator.”68 Even
before the referendum granted him such widespread power, Erdoğan and his party
worked to quell the opposition, even going so far as detaining some forty thousand
people, firing over one hundred thousand government employees, and shutting
down one hundred and seventy-nine media sources. If these actions sound familiar,
they should. Not only did Hitler take similar measures in his rise to power, but so
too did Vladimir Putin, whose views on homosexuality and women’s rights are
frighteningly archaic. Putin’s actions within foreign affairs have also been
incredibly militaristic, from his annexation of the Crimean Peninsula to Russian
support of Syria’s own dictator, Bashar al-Assad. Yet while Putin could be argued
as not fully qualifying as an authoritarian dictator, the same could not be said for
North Korea’s Kim Jong-un. Despite being the youngest head of state in the world,
Kim Jong-un has been responsible for a slew of harsh reprisals against perceived
coups and rebellions, all the while threatening North Korea’s neighbors and
enemies with open nuclear warfare. To complete the picture of an authoritarian
regime, Kim Jong-un has followed in his father and grandfather’s footsteps by
keeping the country closed off to any foreign presence or media to ensure a purely
governmental censorship of information. Yet such matters strike much closer to
home in recent months. Although the United States’ new president, Donald Trump,
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does not command the same level of control and fear that these three figures wield,
he has continued to exhibit beliefs and actions that hint at a future similar to Turkey,
North Korea, or Russia, from his blatant disrespect for minorities to his militant
approach to foreign relations. In many ways not even fully encompassed by the
examples already stated, the twenty-first century has already made ripples that
starkly reflect those created in the previous century. It is those ripples out of which
I hope to draw meaning.
A few weeks ago, in the heart of the summer before the last year of my
undergraduate education, I sat down to write this conclusion and was faced with
the task of distilling the last three years of reading and traveling and discussing and
puzzling and not sleeping into a single cohesive work. I confess I felt outmatched.
How does one begin to synthesize literally thousands of pages of reading? How
does one convey the inspiration and revelation of dozens of weeks of discussion?
How does one instill the overwhelming despair of a concentration camp that, even
diluted by seventy years of disuse, still brought me to my knees? How does one
start such a process? And more importantly, where does one end it? To answer how
a beginning is created, it simply is. You force yourself to sit at the table and open
your laptop and start typing words until the right ones appear on the page, whether
they are the first to surface or the seventy-sixth. Endings, however, are much more
difficult. In some ways, this very paper is an ending, but I hope it is not the end of
everything. I hope that this research will move forward with me and evolve as my
own experiences and knowledge undoubtedly will. I hope that in its next form, this
research will grow to address more than just German imperialism, but European
imperialism as a whole, while still looking to elucidate and legitimize its legacy.
But ultimately, the true goal of this research is simply to make the point that the
events that came before us continue to matter. Whether through advocacy or
education, ignorance of the past must be brought to heel in order to halt the spread
of apathy; without understanding, we cannot hope to empathize, for we cannot care

about what we do not understand. Yet if we can find a way, any way, to
contextualize and clarify the manner and motive that went into different cases of
horror based on the excuse of land, resources, prestige, or divine duty, then we will
have made a step towards crippling the future that holds such ends within it. This
history we share as one people, the human people, must not be forgotten, if for no
other reason than that we will be doomed to relive it. As for me, I hope to give my
children a world in which they will never know violence or hatred or genocide in
the flesh. I hope to give this world to my neighbors’ children and the children of
those who are not my neighbors. Because humans are not made to hate. They are
not made to kill. They are made to live.
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